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Abstract
We examine the optimal labor market-policy mix over the business cycle. In a search and match-
ing model with risk-averse workers, endogenous hiring and separation, and unobservable search
effort we first show how to decentralize the constrained-efficient allocation. This can be achieved
by a combination of a production tax and three labor-market policy instruments, namely, a va-
cancy subsidy, a layoff tax and unemployment benefits. We derive analytical expressions for the
optimal setting of each of these for the steady state and for the business cycle. Our propositions
suggest that hiring subsidies, layoff taxes and the replacement rate of unemployment insurance
should all rise in recessions. We find this confirmed in a calibration targeted to the U.S. economy.
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1 Introduction
Unemployment in the U.S. has risen sharply in the wake of the Great Recession and remains
at stubbornly high levels. Policymakers have reacted to this shock by substantially increasing
the duration of unemployment benefits. In addition, instruments that are less standard, such
as hiring subsidies, for example, are discussed intensively in the current environment and have
been part of previous stimulus packages. A case in point is the Hiring Incentives to Restore
Employment (HIRE) Act that President Obama signed into law on March 18, 2010. Similarly,
payroll subsidies have been used in other countries in the latest recession, a prominent example
being the German short-time working scheme (Kurzarbeit).
Most of the related literature conducts a steady-state analysis and does not speak to the optimal
labor-market policy in response to large business cycle shocks. The recent papers that are
concerned with the business cycle in turn do not study the optimal labor-market policy mix,
but restrict themselves to just one instrument, namely, unemployment benefits; see, for example,
Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010) and Mitman and Rabinovich (2011). The current paper
argues that this focus is restrictive in that it does not take into account that insurance and
incentives can be provided by other means as well. We find that these other means are of first-
order importance. Our main result is that non-standard instruments, namely, hiring subsidies
and layoff taxes, should be actively used and should rise notably in a recession. Once this has
been provided for, there may be little need to adjust unemployment benefits.
This paper studies the optimal labor-market policy mix in a real business cycle model with
Mortensen and Pissarides-type matching frictions in the labor market. The model we use has the
following features: first, workers in our model are risk-averse and do not have savings. Second,
workers have to make a search effort to find a new job. This search effort is private information,
so that unemployment benefits induce distortions and the government faces a trade-off between
insurance and inducing search effort. Third, a frictional labor market as in Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) prevents the immediate reallocation of unemployed workers. In our framework,
an increase in unemployment benefits affects wages, separations, search and hiring activity, all
of which depend on the worker’s outside option. Fourth, layoffs are privately efficient and
affected by the amount of insurance granted to the worker. Fifth, and last, a closed-economy
assumption realistically limits the government’s ability to provide consumption insurance in the
face of aggregate shocks.
We first characterize the planner’s allocation when the planner cannot observe a worker’s search
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effort. We prove that an appropriate mix of vacancy subsidies, layoff taxes, and unemployment
benefits along with a production tax can decentralize the constrained-efficient allocation. We
provide analytical expressions for the optimal tax and benefit policies in the steady state and
over the business cycle and quantify the effects in a calibration for the U.S. economy.
We find that in reaction to a recessionary productivity shock, the government should simultane-
ously increase vacancy subsidies and layoff taxes. Vacancy subsidies rise because hiring can be
induced at a lower cost in a recession: not only does the cost per hire fall but also the opportunity
cost of not having an unemployed worker hired rises because the duration of unemployment rises
in a recession. The resulting costs of unemployment insurance can be reduced if unemployed
workers transit back into employment more rapidly. The subsidies stabilize the job-finding rate
and provide search incentives to unemployed workers in the presence of positive unemployment
benefits. Quantitatively, we find that in response to a negative 1 percent productivity shock,
the government subsidizes an additional 8 percent of the cost of posting a vacancy.
Layoff taxes rise so as to make workers and firms internalize the higher social costs of unem-
ployment in a recession: on the one hand, unemployment spells tend to last longer in recessions;
on the other hand, this prompts the government to subsidize hiring more aggressively. Both of
these activities are costly. In response to a 1 percent drop in productivity, the increase in layoff
taxes amounts to almost 20 percent of a monthly unemployment benefit payment.
We also find that despite the fewer resources that are available, the government does not opt to
reduce unemployment insurance in bad times. Instead, unemployment benefits rise to provide
enhanced insurance at a time when search effort is not particularly elastic to benefits. Quanti-
tatively, we find that the ratio of consumption when unemployed relative to consumption when
employed (the “replacement rate”) should rise by 0.2 percentage point in response to a negative
1 percent productivity shock. The increase in benefits is similar to the findings in Landais,
Michaillat, and Saez (2010). The source of the result differs, however. Whereas they entertain
wages that are exogenous to labor-market policy, in our paper, higher benefits alone would lead
to higher wages and less employment. It is the optimal use of vacancy subsidies and layoff taxes
that allows the government to maintain the generosity of the unemployment insurance system
in bad economic times.
Our paper shows in detail the importance of the hiring subsidy and the layoff tax for our findings.
First, we show numerically that if the government could use unemployment benefits only, not
being able to vary layoff taxes or hiring subsidies in response to the recessionary shock, it
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would opt for steep cuts in benefits. Quantitatively, the replacement rate would fall by almost 1
percentage point in response to a fall in productivity by 1 percent. This cut reduces the worker’s
outside option and leads to more hiring and fewer separations at the cost of reduced insurance for
the unemployed. This is reminiscent of the results in Mitman and Rabinovich (2011). However,
the availability of the non-standard instruments renders such a reaction unnecessary: benefits
can rise and still not make the recession worse.
Second, we look at a scenario in which the state uses only hiring subsidies and layoff taxes opti-
mally but cannot alter benefits over the business cycle. Again, layoff taxes and hiring subsidies
should rise in a recession. Indeed, the increase is quantitatively similar to the fully optimal plan.
The resulting allocation closely resembles the constrained-efficient outcome.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section relates our work to the
existing literature. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the planner’s problem
and provides the tax and benefit rules that decentralize the planner’s allocation. We use these as
a basis for providing intuition for the numerical simulations that follow in later sections. Section
4 presents the calibration of the model economy. Section 5 discusses the optimal policy mix
both in the steady state and over the business cycle. A final section concludes. The Appendix
collects the proofs and derivations.
1.1 Related literature
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first that focuses on the jointly optimal design
of a wider set of labor-market policies over the business cycle in an environment with a genuine
role for unemployment insurance. Various strands of the literature, though, have studied each
of the instruments in isolation either in the steady state or in a business cycle context.
One strand of the literature has studied the impact of tax instruments on the congestion and
thick-market externalities that can arise with matching frictions, Hosios (1990) and Domeij
(2005), or has studied the distortive effects of tax instruments on the wage-setting and hiring
process, Mortensen and Pissarides (2003). This strand tends to focus on models that do not
have a welfare-improving role for unemployment benefits. In contrast, in our framework the lack
of insurance due to moral hazard endogenously induces distortions. The government therefore
requires a rather rich set of instruments to restore the constrained-efficient allocation.
A second strand of the literature studies the optimal provision of unemployment insurance in
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the presence of moral hazard frictions, for example, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Wang and
Williamson (2002), and Shimer and Werning (2008), who present results in the steady state.
This literature typically shows that the consumption profile of unemployed workers has to decline
with the duration of unemployment. Our approach assumes that consumption allocations are
independent of durations for analytical tractability. In the optimum, workers who become
unemployed turn out to be fully insured in the first period of their unemployment spell, because
the incentive-constraint is not binding. Thereafter, however, benefits drop to a level that is
characterized by a dynamic version of the Chetty (2006) formula.
The literature on optimal unemployment insurance has typically ignored the interaction of the
design of unemployment benefits with matching frictions. A notable exception is Coles (2008),
who studies the optimal unemployment benefit provision in a matching equilibrium with un-
observable search effort and exogenous separation. Coles derives analytical expressions for the
optimal duration dependence of unemployment benefits in a steady state without discounting,
and when the government has access to vacancy subsidies. He finds, as we do, a positive role
for vacancy subsidies in decentralizing the constrained-efficient allocation. We extend Coles’
work by analytically characterizing the optimal tax rules over the business cycle in a general
equilibrium labor market search model that has an endogenous separation margin.
A third strand of the literature studies the role of layoff taxes. In a number of variants of a
static model, Blanchard and Tirole (2008) and Cahuc and Zylberberg (2008) consider how layoff
taxes can realign social and private costs. An insight that carries over to our environment is
that firms do not take into account that their layoff decision affects the budget constraint of
the government, so separations are typically larger than is socially optimal. They find that the
first-best allocation can be achieved by unemployment benefits financed entirely by layoff taxes.
Due to the static frameworks, these papers do not deal with the effect of separations on the
job-finding rate and the search incentives of unemployed workers. We extend their results in
several dimensions: first, to the business cycle; second, to an environment with an endogenous
hiring decision; and third, and most important, to a model with an unobservable search decision
that interacts with the hiring and layoff decision. These extensions lead to an additional positive
role for layoff taxes.1
1 We find a welfare-improving role for layoff taxes. This differs from a large set of the literature that assesses
the effects of labor market policies in environments in which – in contrast to our model – there is little scope
for a welfare-improving government intervention. With regard to layoff taxes, see, for example, Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993) and Ljungqvist (2002), who are concerned with the steady state, and Veracierto (2008),
who considers the effects of employment protection on the business cycle.
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The fourth strand of the literature, which is most closely related to what we do, studies how to
optimally set unemployment benefits over the business cycle when labor markets are frictional,
workers are risk-averse, and search effort is not observable; see Mitman and Rabinovich (2011)
and Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010).2 These papers ignore the endogeneity of the separation
margin that potentially further limits the amount of insurance that the government can provide.
Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010) assume a closed economy in which real wages are exogenous
to policy and partially sticky. As a result, real wages do not fall much in a recession, inducing
too little hiring from a social perspective. The planner cannot confront this and, instead, lets
benefits rise in a recession so as not to let workers inefficiently compete for the few jobs that are
available. In contrast, Mitman and Rabinovich (2011) consider a setting where benefits do affect
wages. The government’s only instrument is unemployment benefits. It uses these to induce
search effort and stimulate hiring activity. In numerical simulations they find that both the size
and the duration of benefits should fall in recessions.
Our paper, instead, shifts the focus away from unemployment benefits and, realistically we would
argue, toward a wider set of labor-market instruments. We find that both hiring subsidies and
layoff taxes should rise in a recession and that these two features alone help track closely the
optimal allocation. We find that benefits, too, should increase in recessions. While this is remi-
niscent of the findings in Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010), the reason why the government
can and should provide more insurance in a recession differs. In our framework, an increase in
unemployment benefits affects wages, hiring activity, and separations, all of which depend on the
outside option of the worker. If unemployment benefits were the government’s only instrument,
in our setting these should fall. It is the availability of the other two labor-market instruments
that mitigates the adverse effects of higher benefits and allows for providing better insurance in
a recession.
2 Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of workers with measure one and an infinite measure
of potential one-worker firms. Workers are homogeneous in regard to their ex ante efficiency
of working. Time is discrete. The unemployment benefit system provides the only means of
insuring against an unemployment spell. Search effort by the individual worker is not observ-
2 For a more complete review of this literature, we refer the reader to the overview in Landais, Michaillat, and
Saez (2010).
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able. The unemployment insurance system therefore has to trade off insurance of the individual
against providing incentives for job search. The insurance provided also affects the hiring and
separation decision, since the unemployment insurance system determines the outside option of
the worker when bargaining with the firm. The government taxes layoffs by τξ,t, and raises taxes
on production income τJ,t. It subsidizes a fraction τv,t of the cost of posting a vacancy and pays
unemployment insurance. We consider a closed economy: the government needs to balance its
budget every period.
2.1 Value of the worker and consumption
Workers are risk-averse and have period utility functions u : R→ R that are twice continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing and concave in the period’s consumption level. β ∈ (0, 1) is the
time-discount factor. Workers who do not work enjoy an additive utility of leisure h.
Consumption of the worker is given by
ci,t =


ce,t := wt +Πt if employed at the beginning of t and working in t,
c0,t := weu,t +Πt if employed at the beginning of t but laid off in t,
cu,t := Bt +Πt if unemployed at the beginning of t.
(1)
Here wt marks the wage. Firms are owned equally by all the workers. Πt marks the dividends
that the firms pay. weu,t marks severance payments from the firm to a worker who has just
been laid off. cu,t marks consumption when unemployed. Bt marks the level of unemployment
benefits paid. For future reference, define the replacement rate as bt = cu,t/ce,t.
2.1.1 Value of an employed worker
The value of an employed worker at the beginning of the period, before idiosyncratic shocks are
realized, is
Ve,t = (1− ξt) [u(ce,t) + βEtVe,t+1] + ξtV0,t. (2)
Here ξt marks the probability that the match separates in the course of the period, discussed
below. V0,t is the ex ante value in t of a worker who has been laid off in t. Similarly, for future
reference, let Vu,t denote the ex ante value of a worker who enters the period unemployed.
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2.1.2 Value of an unemployed worker, search and worker’s surplus from working
Unemployed workers need to actively search in order to find a job. Workers are differentiated
by their utility cost of search, ιi,t ∼ Fι(0, σ
2
ι ). For tractability, these costs are independently
and identically distributed both across workers and across time and follow a logistic distribution
with mean 0 and variance σ2ι := π
ψ2s
3 , where a lower case π refers to the mathematical constant.
Search effort is not observable to the government. This generates the moral hazard on the side
of the unemployed worker. All workers whose disutility of search falls below a certain cutoff
value ιst do search for a job. For the worker who is just at the cutoff value, the utility cost of
search just balances with the expected gains from search:
ιst = ft β Et [Ve,t+1 − Vu,t+1] . (3)
The gains from search are the discounted utility gain when employed next period rather than
unemployed multiplied by the probability, ft, that a searching worker will find a job.
Using the properties of the logistic distribution, the share of non-employed workers who search
is given by
st = Prob(ι ≤ ι
s
t) = 1/ (1 + exp {−ι
s
t/ψs}) . (4)
The ex ante value of an unemployed worker is given by
Vu,t = u(cu,t) + h
+
∫ ιst
−∞ [−ιi + ft βEtVe,t+1 + (1− ft)βEtVu,t+1] dFι(ιi)
+
∫∞
ιst
βEtVu,t+1dFι(ιi).
(5)
Regardless of the search decision, in the current period the unemployed worker receives con-
sumption cu,t and enjoys utility of leisure h. If the worker decides to search (second row), he
suffers utility cost ιi. Compensating for this, with probability ft the worker will find a job. In
that case, the worker’s value in the next period will be Ve,t+1. With probability (1 − ft) the
worker remains unemployed, in which case the worker’s value in the next period will be Vu,t+1.
If the worker does not search (third row), the worker will continue to be unemployed in the next
period.
Apart from the consumption stream in the first period, the value of an unemployed worker who
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has just been laid off is the same as that of a worker who enters the period unemployed:
V0,t = Vu,t + u(c0,t)− u(cu,t). (6)
For future reference we also need to define the surplus of the currently employed worker from
employment as ∆eu,t := Ve,t − Vu,t.
2.2 Labor market flows
We denote the measure of workers who are employed at the beginning of period t by et and the
measure of workers who are unemployed at the beginning of the period by ut, so that ut = 1−et.
Employment at the beginning of the next period evolves according to
et+1 = (1− ξt)et +mt, (7)
where ξt is the rate of separation of existing matches in period t and mt is the number of new
matches formed in period t, which evolves according to
mt = stft[ξtet + ut]. (8)
Here ξtet + ut is the mass of workers who are potentially searching during period t. That mass
comprises the workers laid off at the beginning of the period, ξtet, and the mass of workers who
entered the period unemployed, ut. st is the share of these workers who search for a job. ft is
the probability with which a worker who looks for a job actually finds one.
2.3 Production and the value of the firm
Firms can be matched with exactly one worker and produce. If they do not have a worker,
they can decide to create a vacancy. Firms are owned in an equal amount by all the workers
in the economy and rebate their profits to all workers in the population. We assume that firms
therefore discount the future using discount factor Qt,t+s, where Qt,t+s := β
λt+s
λt
, with λt is the
weighted marginal utility of the firm’s owners:
λt :=
(
et(1− ξt)
u′(ce,t)
+
etξt
u′(c0,t)
+
ut
u′(cu,t)
)−1
. (9)
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A firm j that is matched to a worker can produce an amount exp{at} of output. Aggregate
productivity, at, evolves according to
at = ρa at−1 + εa,t, ρa ∈ [0, 1), εa,t ∼ N(0, σ
2
a).
Production entails a firm-specific cost ǫj,t ∼ Fǫ(µǫ, σ
2
ǫ ). For analytical tractability, we specify
this shock as independently and identically distributed across both matches and time. Fǫ(·, ·)
marks the logistic distribution with mean µǫ and variance σ
2
ǫ = π
ψ2ǫ
3 .
The ex-ante value of the firm, namely, before the idiosyncratic shock ǫj is realized, is given by
Jt = −
∫∞
ǫ
ξ
t
[τξ,t + weu,t] dFǫ(ǫj)
+
∫ ǫξt
−∞ [exp{at} − ǫj − wt − τJ,t + EtQt,t+1Jt+1] dFǫ(ǫj).
(10)
The firm separates from the worker (first line) whenever the idiosyncratic cost shock, ǫj , is larger
than a state-dependent threshold ǫξt , the determination of which will be discussed in Section 2.5.
Doing so, it is mandated to pay layoff tax τξ,t to the government and a previously negotiated
severance payment weu,t to the worker. The match will produce (second line) if ǫj does not
exceed the threshold. In that case, output of the firm is exp{at}, and the firm will pay wage wt
to the worker and a production tax τJ,t to the government. A match that produces this period
continues into the next. The last item in square brackets on the second line is the continuation
value.
2.4 Matching and vacancy posting
Firms that do not have a worker can post a vacancy at cost κv(1 − τv,t) > 0. Parameter κv is
the resource cost of posting a vacancy and τv,t marks a subsidy that is proportional to that cost.
New matches mt are created according to
mt = χ v
α
t ([ξtet + ut]st)
1−α ,
where χ > 0 governs the matching-efficiency and α ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of matches with
respect to vacancies. The probability of filling a vacancy is given by qt := mt/vt. The job-
finding rate, ft, is given by ft := mt/([ξtet+ut]st). Labor-market tightness is defined as θt =
vt
ut
.
In equilibrium, firms post vacancies until the after-tax cost of posting a vacancy equals the
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prospective gains from hiring:
κv(1− τv,t) = qtEt [Qt,t+1Jt+1] . (11)
2.5 Bargaining
At the beginning of the period, matched workers and firms observe the aggregate shock, at.
Conditional on this, and prior to observing the match-specific cost shock ǫj , firms and workers
bargain about the wage and the severance payment as well as about a state-contingent plan for
separation. They use generalized Nash bargaining:3
(wt, weu,t, ǫ
ξ
t ) = argmaxwt,ǫξt ,weu,t
(∆eu,t)
1−ηt(Jt)
ηt , (12)
where η measures the bargaining power of the firm. Note that, in principle, we allow this bargain-
ing weight to vary with the state of the economy. Due to the bilateral bargaining, the separation
decision will be privately efficient. Also observe that the firm’s owners are insured against id-
iosyncratic risk associated with the cost shocks since they hold a well-diversified portfolio of
individual firms. The firm will therefore insure the risk-averse worker against the idiosyncratic
risk associated with ǫj so that the wage, wt, and the severance payment weu,t are independent
of the realization of ǫj. The notation below anticipates this outcome.
The first-order condition for the wage states that after adjusting for the bargaining weights, the
value of the firm equals the surplus of the worker from working expressed in units of consumption
when employed
(1− ηt)Jt = ηt
∆eu,t
u′(ce,t)
. (13)
The first-order condition for the severance payments is that consumption when employed equals
consumption in the period of the layoff, ce,t = ceu,t. Equivalently, the severance payment equals
3 The literature, for example, Ljungqvist (2002), entertains two different possibilities for how layoff taxes affect
the worker’s relative share of the match surplus. In one of these, indirect effects apart, the worker’s relative
share is not affected by the layoff tax. This is the setup we use here. We assume that the government can
distinguish between a layoff and a breakdown in bargaining. Note that, ex ante, the joint surplus is always
positive in our setup, so in any period every match will conclude the bargaining successfully. An alternative
arrangement assumes that the layoff tax would also be payable if merely the bargaining broke down. A layoff
tax then would improve the worker’s bargaining position. In order to decentralize the constrained-efficient
allocation, another instrument would be needed: in the case where a worker who was employed last period
claimed unemployment benefits in this period but cannot present a valid contract for employment for the
current period, the government would pay out only a fraction of benefits in the first period. One could always
choose the fraction such that the bargaining outcome is the same as in our main text. As a result, and since
this affects only off-equilibrium outcomes, the setting of all other instruments would not be affected.
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the wage weu,t = wt.
Worker and firm will separate once the idiosyncratic productivity shock has materialized if the
joint surplus of the match is negative. The first-order condition for the separation cutoff yields
ǫξt = [exp{at} − τJ,t + τξ,t + EtQt,t+1Jt+1] +
βEt∆
e
u,t+1 + ψs log(1− st)− h
u′(ce,t)
. (14)
Using the properties of the logistic distribution, the separation rate is given by
ξt = Prob(ǫj ≥ ǫ
ξ
t ) = 1/
(
1 + exp
{
(ǫξt − µǫ)/ψǫ
})
. (15)
2.6 Dividends
Aggregate profits are given by
Πt = et
(∫ ǫξt
−∞ [exp{at} − ǫ− wt − τJ,t] dFǫ(ǫ)−
∫∞
ǫ
ξ
t
[wt + τξ,t] dFǫ(ǫ)
)
− κv(1− τv,t)vt.
(16)
These are distributed as dividends to the mutual fund that the workers own. The mutual fund
in turn directly distributes the firms’ dividends in equal amount to all workers in the economy.
2.7 Government
The government’s budget constraint is given by
et (1− ξt) τJ,t + et ξt τξ,t = utBt + κvτv,tvt, (17)
reflecting revenue from the production and layoff tax on the left-hand side, as well as layouts for
unemployment benefits and the vacancy subsidy on the right-hand side. It remains to specify
the tax and subsidy rules, τJ,t, τξ,t, τv,t, and UI benefit payments, Bt. These are derived further
below in a way that implements the constrained-efficient allocation.
2.8 Market clearing
Total production in the economy is given by
yt = et(1− ξt) exp{at}.
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Output is used for consumption, production costs and vacancy posting. Market-clearing requires
yt = etce,t + utcu,t + et
∫ ǫξt
−∞
ǫ dFǫ(ǫ) + κvvt.
3 Tax and benefit policies
Before assessing the optimal policy mix quantitatively, we devote this section to building in-
tuition. We first describe the planner’s problem. We then characterize the tax and benefit
rules that implement the resulting constrained-efficient allocation and discuss how the trade-offs
inherent in the model shape the use of the instruments over the business cycle.
3.1 The planner’s problem
The central friction in the current paper is that the planner cannot directly command or observe
the search decision of an individual worker. Rather, the planner has to provide incentives for
searching for a job and for retaining a job. Throughout, we consider a planner who can condition
consumption allocations for the worker on the worker’s current state of employment, but not on
the worker’s entire employment history. While this quite obviously is a restriction relative to
some work in the literature, for example, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) or Shimer and Werning
(2008), we would argue that it is not without realism.
There are three states in the planner’s problem: aggregate technology, at, the stock of workers
who are employed at the beginning of the period, et, and the (state-contingent value) of the
utility difference, ∆eu,t, that the planner had promised to the searching worker in the previous
period.4
We consider a utilitarian planner who gives equal weight to all workers. Using the assumptions
laid out above, the planner’s objective can be written as
Wt = max
ξt,θt,cu,t,ce,t,{∆eu,t+1}
etu(ce,t) + utu(cu,t) + (etξt + ut)(Ψs(st) + h) + βEtWt+1, (18)
The first term on the right-hand side is the consumption-related utility of employed workers,
and the second term is the consumption-related utility of unemployed workers. The third term
4 Recall from equation (3) that the expected utility difference governs the search decision.
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refers to the value of leisure and the utility costs of search.5 The final term is the continuation
value.
The planner faces four constraints: the aggregate resource constraint, the participation con-
straint of the worker, the promise-keeping constraint and the law of motion for employment.
The planner maximizes over separations and market tightness for the current period, over con-
sumption levels for the employed and unemployed for the current period, and over promised
utility levels for the next period, {∆eu,t+1}, which are contingent on the future state of the
economy.
In regard to the constraints, the aggregate resource constraint is given by
et(1− ξt) exp{at} = etce,t + utcu,t + et(1− ξt)µǫ − etΨξ(ξt) + (etξt + 1− et)κvstθt.
On the left-hand side there is aggregate output. On the right-hand side there appear aggregate
consumption, the idiosyncratic production costs and the resource costs of posting vacancies.
Next, the government has to induce search effort by the unemployed workers. Search effort is
given by:
st =
(
1 + exp
{
−ftβEt∆eu,t+1
ψι
})−1
,
where the planner has to use the same matching technology as in the decentralized economy,
namely, ft = χθ
γ
t . Key to inducing search effort is the government’s promise of an increase in
utility when a worker moves from unemployment to employment. This utility difference between
work and unemployment evolves according to
∆eu,t = u(ce,t)− h(1− ξt)− u(cu,t) + βEt(1− ξt)∆
e
u,t+1 + (1− ξt)ψs log(1− st).
Last, the planner is bound by the aggregate laws of motion of employment.
et+1 = et(1− ξt) + (ξtet + ut)stft.
Appendix A provides the first-order conditions of the planner’s problem that characterize the
constrained-efficient allocation.
5 Here Ψs(st) := −ψs [(1− st) log(1− st) + st log(st)] . Ψξ(ξt) that is used further below is defined in an anal-
ogous manner.
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3.2 Optimal policy mix in the steady state
We now discuss the decentralization of the constrained-efficient allocation by means of taxes and
benefits. We start by focusing on the steady state of the economy. This way we can compare our
results with the literature, which has focused largely on steady states. In addition, it already
allows us to highlight the key tradeoffs. Having done this, in Section 3.3 we state our central
Proposition 2 that describes in detail the optimal setting of the taxes and benefits over the
business cycle.
Proposition 1. Define Ω := η
γ
1−γ
1−η . Assume that the economy has converged to the non-
stochastic steady state. Then the following set of taxes, subsidies and benefits implement the
constrained-efficient steady-state allocation:
τv = [1− Ω] +
η
(1− η)
ζ
κv
θ
f
, (19)
τξ = τJ + τvκv
θ
f
+ ζ (1− sf) , (20)
B +Π = e
1− β
β
κv
θ
f
+ ζ
[
e
1− β
β
+ sf
]
, (21)
τJ =
1− e
e
[cu −Π] + κvτvθ
[
1− e
e
s− ξ
1− sf
f
]
− ξ(1− sf)ζ. (22)
Here
ζ =
ψs
f(1− s)
(1− e)
[ξe+ (1− e)]
[
u
′(cu)− u
′(ce)
u′(ce)u′(cu)
]
. (23)
Proof. This is the steady-state analogue of Proposition 2, the proof of which is in Appendix
B.3.
The interpretation is as follows. The key term for the tradeoffs in the economy is ζ ≥ 0, given
by equation (23). It summarizes the tensions originating from the insurance motive and moral
hazard. If there were a large family that provided insurance to individual household members
and controlled search effort, the moral hazard friction would be absent and the marginal utilities
when employed and unemployed would be equalized; ζ would be zero. Similarly, if workers were
risk-neutral, marginal utilities would be constant, and the insurance motive would be absent; ζ
would again be equal to zero. In that case, which was examined in Mortensen and Pissarides
(2003) and many other papers, vacancy subsidies would take care only of the search externalities
that arise from any violation of the Hosios (1990) condition, the term 1− Ω in square brackets
in equation (19). Unemployment benefits would be about zero (exactly zero if β → 1). Our
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proposition extends the existing body of work to an environment with an endogenous, and
unobservable, search decision by a risk-averse worker.
To the extent that workers are risk-averse, the government wants to provide unemployment
benefits even if this negatively affects the search decision. The more risk-averse the worker is,
the more insurance the government provides, even if this exacerbates the moral hazard problem;
see equations (21) and (23). In that case, vacancy subsidies help to provide search incentives
that alleviate the moral hazard problem. Layoff taxes in turn provide an incentive to hold on to
a worker. An important element that shapes the tradeoff between insurance and moral hazard
is the elasticity of the search margin with respect to earnings. If the margin is very elastic (ψs is
large), the provision of unemployment benefits considerably reduces the search intensity. Even
small vacancy subsidies can have a notable effect on the search effort in that case.
Next, in Corollary 1 we zoom in still further, on the case β → 1.
Corollary 1. Under the same conditions as in Proposition 1, assume further that β → 1, then
1. Consumption when employed and unemployed follow a version of the Baily-Chetty formula:
u
′(cu) = u
′(ce) [1 +D ǫD2 ] . (24)
Here D = 1
sf
is the average duration of an unemployment spell. D2 = D − 1 is the
duration over which the government on average will need to pay unemployment benefits to
an unemployed worker. ǫD2 :=
D
D2
f
ψs
(1 − s)cuu
′(cu) is the elasticity of duration D2 with
respect to an increase in next period’s consumption of an unemployed worker.
2. Under the additional assumptions of log-utility, and with γ = η, we have that ζ =
1−e
ξe+(1−e)
ce(1−b)
ǫD
, and that the optimal tax and benefit rules are
τv =
η
1− η
D cu
κv
θ
f
, (25)
τξ = τJ + τvκvθ/f +D2 cu, (26)
b =
(
1 +
1
ψs
1− s
s
[
ξe
1− e
+ 1
])−1
(27)
τJ = −
1− e
e
Π. (28)
Here, b := cu/ce ∈ (0, 1), τv > 0, and τJ < 0. If dividends Π are sufficiently small τξ > 0.
Proof. Item 1 is proved in Appendix C. Item 2 is a restricted version of Proposition 1.
Item 1 of Corollary 1 shows that in the limit the planner sets unemployment compensation
according to a version of the Baily-Chetty formula (Baily 1978, Chetty 2006). In particular, the
planner equates the marginal utility of consumption of an unemployed worker to the marginal
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utility of consumption of an employed worker, correcting for the marginal impact that the
insurance has on the search effort of the unemployed.
In regard to Item 2 of the Corollary, we zoom in on a special case with log-utility. In addition, we
assume γ = η so that the Hosios condition would be satisfied if workers were risk-neutral. The
only reason for non-zero values of the fiscal instruments in this case is the insurance-moral-hazard
tradeoff. We see that typically all three labor-market instruments, namely, benefits, the vacancy
subsidy and the layoff tax, will be positive. The higher the consumption of an unemployed worker
and the longer the duration of unemployment, the more will the government subsidize hiring so
as to provide incentives for firms to hire workers and for workers to search for work. In addition,
the lower the costs per hire (the smaller κvθt/ft) the more recourse the government makes
to vacancy subsidies. If a firm posts a vacancy, it increases an individual worker’s incentives
to search. This has two effects that are positive from a social of view. First, it allows the
government to provide more insurance while retaining the incentives to search. Second, if it
leads to recruitment, it reduces the costs of unemployment insurance to the government. In
particular, randomly pick a worker who is unemployed. The expected duration of the worker’s
unemployment spell going forward is D = 1/sf . The vacancy subsidy condition (25) states that
at the optimum, the cost per hire to the taxpayer, τvκvθ/f , equals the amount of unemployment
benefits that the government would have paid out over that unemployment spell, Dcu, weighted
by a factor of proportionality given by the bargaining power of the firm: (1− η)τvκv
θ
f
= ηDcu.
Intuitively, the larger the bargaining power of the firm, the larger is its share of the match surplus
and the lower are wages. As a result, the larger η, the less does an additional vacancy create
incentives to search. The government therefore needs to provide for more vacancies through
larger subsidies. Note that vacancy subsidies are unambiguously positive, as in Coles (2008).
Layoff taxes are an integral part of the optimal tax and benefit system. As long as firms’ steady-
state profits are small enough and unemployment durations long enough, layoff taxes, too, will be
positive; compare Blanchard and Tirole (2008), who use a static setting without an endogenous
search decision. Layoff taxes, equation (30), make the worker and firm internalize more of the
social costs of their private decisions. This is needed despite the fact that in our model economy,
separations are privately efficient. That is, workers and firms do take into account the utility
cost of unemployment to the worker and the forgone profit opportunities of the firm. Still, a
separation means forgone revenue from production taxes, and it means that hiring subsidies
are being paid to bring the worker back into employment. In addition, unemployment benefits
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have to be provided. A worker and firm who do separate do not take into account the effect of
their actions on the search incentives of the already unemployed and on the government budget
constraint. This result of full experience rating in the limit confirms findings in the literature,
for example, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2008), who with an exogenous job-finding rate derive the
optimal mix of layoff taxes, benefits and labor taxes in the steady state when the search decision
is endogenous but observable to the government. Our results extend theirs to an unobservable
search decision and to the business cycle, to which we turn next.
3.3 Tax and benefit responses over the business cycle
The discussion of the steady state above provides the intuition for the tradeoffs that arise if we
consider business cycle fluctuations. For example, with log-utility, equation (27) of the corollary
can be rewritten as
b =
1
1 +DǫD2
.
This suggests that the business cycle has two opposing effects on the generosity of unemployment
benefits provided, as measured by the replacement rate b = cu/ce. On the one hand, the
evolution of benefits depends on the duration of an unemployment spell, D, which typically rises
in a recession. In a closed economy a recessionary shock reduces the available resources. This
makes financing unemployment benefits more demanding for the remaining employed workers.
This scarcity or financing effect tends to reduce benefits in a recession. On the other hand, the
elasticity to search ǫD2 :=
D
D2
f
ψs
(1−s) is affected by the business cycle as well and typically falls
in a recession. This is due to the typical decline in the aggregate hiring rate f in a recession. In
essence, recessions are particularly bad times to provide search effort because, due to aggregate
conditions outside the worker’s control, the likelihood of finding a new job declines. In the
extreme, if there were a complete “hiring freeze” so f → 0, the elasticity ǫD would go to zero as
well. Providing incentives to search would then be irrelevant. The government would provide
as much insurance as possible. This effect tends to increase benefit payments in a recession and
is, as we will show, quantitatively the dominant force at work.
Vacancy subsidies and layoff taxes are driven by the dynamics of ζt, which, staying with the
assumptions of log-utility and β → 1, is given by ζ = cuD. Focus first on the vacancy subsi-
dies. Two forces are at work. First, recessions tend to increase the total costs of insuring an
unemployment spell. While consumption when unemployed cu will typically fall, this tends to
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be dwarfed by a strong increase in the average duration of unemployment.6 As the costs to
the government of not having a worker employed thereby increase, the government considers it
worthwhile to raise hiring subsidies in a recession; see equation (25). Second, and working in
the same direction, the cost per hire κvθ/f will typically fall in a recession, further tilting the
environment toward an increase in vacancy subsidies.
Equation (26), which characterizes the layoff tax , suggests that these should rise in a recession.
Keeping a worker at the margin employed is more valuable from a society’s perspective in
a recession because the expected duration of unemployment and the associated costs to the
taxpayer increase. Working in the same direction, and as discussed above, the outlays for hiring
subsidies also tend to increase in a recession.
Having discussed the intuition that one can obtain using the steady-state relationships, we next
state the central proposition of this paper. In particular, Proposition 2 summarizes the tax and
benefit rules that decentralize the constrained-efficient allocation over the business cycle.
Proposition 2. Consider the economy described in Section 2. Consider CRRA preferences.
Define Ωt :=
ηt
γ
1−γ
1−ηt
. Assume that the bargaining power ηt+1 is measurable t. Assume further
that the values of the tuple of initial states (b0, a0, e0) is the same in the decentralized economy
and in the planner’s problem described in Section 3.1. Suppose, in addition, that the government
implements the following policies for all periods t ≥ 0:
τv,t =
[
1−
Ωt+1
1 + ςt
]
+
ηt+1
1− ηt+1
ζt
(1 + ςt)κv
θt
ft
, (29)
τξ,t = τJ,t + τv,tκv
θt
ft
+ ζt(1− stft), (30)
bt+1Et
[
β
λt+1
λt
ce,t+1
et+1
]
= τv,tκv
θt
ft
+ ζt − Et
[
β
λt+1
λt
ζt+1(1− st+1ft+1)(1 − ξt+1)
]
−Et
[
β
λt+1
λt
τv,t+1κv
θt+1
ft+1
et+2
et+1
]
+ Et
[
β
λt+1
λt
Πt+1
et+1
]
, (31)
τJ,t =
1− et
et
[btce,t −Πt] + κvτv,tθt
[
1− et
et
st − ξt
1− stft
ft
]
−ζtξt(1− stft), (32)
where the two wedges ζt and ςt are given by (33) and (34).
Then these tax rules are consistent with the government’s budget constraint. In addition, the
equilibrium allocations in the decentralized equilibrium satisfy the first-order conditions in the
6 In contrast to an open economy, the government cannot fully consumption-insure the society as a whole against
aggregate fluctuations and will therefore, typically, reduce consumption of all workers, including the unem-
ployed, due to the scarcity of aggregate resources. Note that the replacement rate, that is, the consumption
levels of unemployed workers relative to employed workers, will typically increase nevertheless if consump-
tion of the unemployed due to the curvature of the utility function falls by less than the consumption of the
employed.
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planner’s problem and vice versa.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.3.
A discussion of the proposition is in order. First, in regard to the conditions under which the
proposition holds, note that these are not particularly stringent. The tax and benefit rules
provided in the proposition hold exactly. If one were to relax the assumption that bargaining
power ηt+1 is measurable t, the tax and benefit rules would still remain valid up to a first-order
approximation, with ηt+1 then replaced by Etηt+1.
In regard to content, the proposition shows that over the cycle additional intertemporal wedges
show up in some places. Dynamically, wedge ζt is given by
ζt =
ψs
ft(1− st)
1
λt
1− et
[ξtet + (1− et)]
1−
u
′(ce,t)
u′(cu,t)
u′(ce,t)
u′(cu,t)
(1− et) + et
(33)
+
ψs
ft(1− st)
1
stft[ξtet + (1− et)]
1
λt
et+1

 1
u′(ce,t+1)
u′(cu,t+1)
(1− et+1) + et+1
−
1
u′(ce,t)
u′(cu,t)
(1− et) + et

 .
The first row resembles the results we discussed for the steady state. The second row is related
to how the degree of insurance evolves over time. It is zero in the steady state. Similarly ςt,
given by
ςt =
et(1− ξt)
[ξtet + (1− et)]ftst

1− u
′(ce,t+1)
u′(cu,t+1)
(1− et+1) + et+1
u′(ce,t)
u′(cu,t)
(1− et) + et

 . (34)
measures how the wedge between the planner’s marginal utility of wealth and the employed
workers’ marginal utility evolves over time. ς is equal to zero in the steady state.
The previous discussions using the steady-state equations summarize the effects quite neatly for
the vacancy subsidies, equation (29), and the layoff taxes, equation (30), which turn out to take
the same form as in the steady state. The benefit rule is quite a bit more complex, however.
From a technical point of view, it is worth mentioning that while the government cannot fully
insure the worker’s consumption, the utility promise for the future is such that it entails a time
path of the replacement rate, bt+1, that does not depend on tomorrow’s state of the economy;
see equation (31).
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4 Calibration
This section calibrates the model to the U.S. economy. Our strategy is as follows. For the
baseline, we specify simple tax and benefit rules that are roughly in line with the current
U.S. setup. We then calibrate the model’s parameters such that it matches key properties of
the U.S. labor market. Subsequently, in Section 5, we treat these parameters as structural and
ask what the labor market-policy mix should look like.
4.1 Data used for the calibration
We calibrate the model to data from 1976Q1 through 2011Q1.7 Output y is taken to be the
real output in the nonfarm business sector. Labor productivity, y
e(1−ξ) , is measured as output
per person in the nonfarm business sector. The unemployment rate is the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ (BLS) civilian unemployment rate. In regard to vacancies, we rely on Barnichon’s
(2010) composite help-wanted index.8 We equate the job-finding rate, ft, with the monthly
transition probability from unemployment to employment in the Current Population Survey
(CPS). We adjust the data for time aggregation as in Shimer (2007). We equate the separation
rate, ξt, with the flow rate from employment to unemployment in the same data set. This rate,
too, is adjusted for time-aggregation.9 Our measure of the wage is real compensation per person
employed in the nonfarm business sector, where nominal compensation has been deflated by the
implicit price deflator for the nonfarm business sector. All series are seasonally adjusted.
The business cycle properties of the data are reported in Table 1. Whenever the frequency of the
raw series is monthly, for assessing the fluctuations we take a quarterly average of the monthly
data. Following Shimer (2005), the table reports the log deviations of these quarterly averages
from an HP trend with a smoothing parameter of 105. The business cycle properties of the data
are well-known. Unemployment and vacancies, ut and vt, are volatile and so is market tightness,
vt/ut. The job-finding rate, ft, is strongly procyclical. The separation rate, ξt, is countercyclical
and somewhat less responsive to the cycle than the finding rate. Wages are mildly procyclical
7 This sample is dictated by the availability of the Current Population Survey. Unless noted otherwise, all but
the CPS data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FREDII database and were downloaded on
08/25/2011.
8 Prior to 1995 the series is the conventional newspaper help-wanted advertising series. Afterward, the index
links the Conference Board’s print and help-wanted advertising indexes and accounts for the changing shares
of these modes of advertising over time.
9 In the sample, the average job-finding and separation rates are, respectively, 28 percent and 1.9 percent per
month.
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Table 1: Business cycle properties of the data
y Lprod urate v f ξ w θ
Standard deviation 3.34 1.85 17.46 18.55 12.29 8.52 1.94 34.85
Autocorrelation 0.95 0.91 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.80 0.95 0.96
y 1.00 0.62 -0.89 0.80 0.86 -0.73 0.64 0.87
Lprod - 1.00 -0.29 0.28 0.25 -0.61 0.72 0.29
urate - - 1.00 -0.87 -0.96 0.72 -0.38 -0.97
Correlation v - - - 1.00 0.87 -0.68 0.22 0.97
f - - - - 1.00 -0.65 0.32 0.95
ξ - - - - - 1.00 -0.42 -0.72
w - - - - - - 1.00 0.31
θ - - - - - - – 1.00
Notes: The table reports second moments of the data. The sample is 1976Q1 to 2011Q1. Lprod is labor
productivity per worker. urate is the unemployment rate. All data are quarterly aggregates, in logs, HP(105)
filtered and multiplied by 100 in order to express them in percent deviation from the steady state. The first
row reports the standard deviation. The next row reports the autocorrelation. The following rows report the
contemporaneous correlation matrix. See the text for details regarding the definition of the data.
and somewhat less volatile than output.
4.2 Calibrated parameters
We calibrate the model for log utility. One period in the model is a month. Table 2 summarizes
the calibrated parameters. We set the time-discount factor to β = 0.996. We set the utility from
Table 2: Parameters for baseline
Preferences
β time-discount factor. 0.996
h disutility of work. 0.384
ψs scaling parameter dispersion utility cost of search. 0.215
Vacancies, matching and bargaining
κv vacancy posting cost. 0.176
α match elasticity with respect to vacancies. 0.300
χ scaling parameter for match-efficiency. 0.297
η steady-state bargaining power of firm. 0.300
γw degree of cyclicality of bargaining power of worker. 13.97
Production and layoffs
µǫ mean idiosyncratic cost. 0.063
ψǫ scaling parameter dispersion idiosyncratic cost shock. 0.659
ρa AR(1) of aggregate productivity. 0.983
σa · 100 std. dev. of innovation to aggregate productivity. 0.348
Labor market policy
b Replacement rate 0.451
τv Vacancy posting subsidy. 0
τξ Layoff tax 0.680
Notes: The table reports the calibrated parameter values in the baseline economy.
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leisure to h = 0.384 such that in the steady state 7.5 percent of workers are unemployed (ξe+u).
As a result, the gap between the unemployment rate, which is 6.4 percent in both the calibrated
model and the data, and the share of unemployed workers replicates the typical gap between
the “U3” measure of unemployment, that requires active search, and the BLS’s “U5” measure,
which includes workers who would take up work but who have not been actively searching for a
job. We set ψs = 0.215 to replicate an elasticity of the average duration of unemployment with
respect to UI benefits of 0.8, which is in line with the empirical literature, for example, Meyer
(1990).10 We set a vacancy posting cost of κv = 0.176 so as to obtain an average unemployment
rate of 6.4 percent as in the data.11 This results in an average cost per hire vκv
m
of 0.55 monthly
wages – in line with a broader notion of recruiting costs; see Silva and Toledo (2009). We set
the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies to α = 0.3 similar to Shimer
(2005) and within the range of estimates deemed reasonable by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
We set the firm’s bargaining power to η = 0.3 so that, absent risk aversion, the Hosios (1990)
condition would be satisfied without any government intervention. We view this as a natural –
and customary – choice. In order to determine the matching-efficiency parameter, we target a
quarterly job-filling rate of 71 percent as in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000). This results
in χ = 0.297.
It is well-known that without wage rigidity the search and matching model may not easily
replicate the size of the cyclical fluctuations that one observes in the labor market; see Shimer
(2005), Hall (2005), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), and Pissarides (2009). In our calibration,
we make use of one mechanism that dampens wage fluctuations and that therefore increases
fluctuations in the labor market: a procyclical bargaining power of firms (so in recessions, wages
tend to be “too high” relative to productivity); compare Shimer (2005). More in detail, we
specify that the bargaining power follows
ηt = η exp{γwat−1}, γw ≥ 0.
10 The elasticity takes into account the effect of a permanent increase in UI benefits on an individual’s search
effort (and thus on the duration of unemployment) but not the general equilibrium effect of UI benefits on the
job-finding rate and the separation margin. The elasticity can be shown to be
ǫDu = cuu
′(cu)
1
ψs
βf(1− s)
1− β(1− ξ)(1− sf)
.
11 The “unemployment rate” in the model is defined as uratet = (etξt + ut)st/[(etξt + ut)st + et(1 − ξt)], and
includes only those unemployed workers who did actively search for work.
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Note that related assumptions are common in the literature.12 We choose the value of γw
that generates an amount of volatility in the job-finding rate, ft, that is comparable to the
data summarized in Table 1. This implies γw = 13.97. As a result, for a 1 percent negative
productivity shock the bargaining power of firms falls by about 14 percent, or, put differently,
from η = 0.3 to a value of ηt = 0.26.
We calibrate the location parameter for the idiosyncratic cost shock so that the average cost
shock of a firm that decides to produce is zero. This yields µǫ = 0.063. We calibrate the
dispersion parameter for the idiosyncratic cost shock to ψǫ = 0.659. This ensures an average
job-finding rate of f = 0.28 as in the data. In regard to aggregate productivity, we set the serial
correlation of the productivity shock to ρa = 0.983 and the standard deviation of the shock to
σa = 0.00348. With these values the model replicates the volatility and serial correlation of labor
productivity in the data.
In regard to policy variables, for the baseline we specify these directly and set them to constant
values. We set the replacement rate, b = cu,t/ce,t, such that in the steady state benefit payments
by the government replace 45 percent of wages when employed, namely, B/w = 0.45. This
follows Engen and Gruber (2001). We set vacancy subsidies to τv,t = 0. Layoff taxes are set
to a constant value of τξ,t = 0.68. This value is determined as follows. In our calibration, the
average duration of unemployment is 4.2 months (a little bit above the average duration of 16.4
weeks in the data). The replacement rate of unemployment benefits in our calibration is 45
percent of wages. This implies that over the typical unemployment spell, the government pays
unemployment benefits equivalent to about 1.45 monthly wages (recall that in the first period of
unemployment the worker receives the severance payment, not unemployment benefits). We set
the layoff tax such that it covers 50 percent of these payments.13 Column “baseline” of Table 5
in Appendix D reports the resulting steady-state values of the model.
In regard to the cyclical properties, the calibrated model does a good job of replicating the
fluctuations in the data; see Table 3. Unemployment and vacancies are considerably more volatile
12 For example, Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010) directly specify that wt = w exp{̺at}, with ̺ = 0.5 as
an exogenous wage rule. In our framework, workers and firms bargain about the wage. Due to the shifting
bargaining powers, however, the resulting equilibrium wage will be less responsive to productivity than under
a Nash-bargaining protocol with a constant bargaining power. As a point of reference, a regression of wages
on productivity would yield an elasticity of wages with respect to productivity of 0.94 in our model; compare
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2008).
13 For the years 1988 through 2003, the Employment and Training Administration within the U.S. Department
of Labor provides an experience-rating index. While the degree of de facto experience rating differs across
states, the index suggests that experience rating is imperfect in the sense that individual firms typically pay
for only about 50 percent of the costs of benefits for the unemployment spells that they “cause.”
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Table 3: Business cycle properties of the model
y Lprod urate v f ξ w θ
Standard deviation 3.37 1.85 18.71 23.07 12.29 7.70 1.74 40.96
Autocorrelation 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.96
y 1.00 0.99 -0.99 0.97 0.99 -0.99 1.00 0.99
Lprod - 1.00 -0.98 0.99 1.00 -0.99 0.99 1.00
urate - - 1.00 -0.94 -0.98 0.99 -0.99 -0.98
Correlation v - - - 1.00 0.98 -0.98 0.97 0.98
f - - - - 1.00 -0.99 0.99 1.00
ξ - - - - - 1.00 -0.99 -0.99
w - - - - - - 1.00 0.99
v/u - - - - - - - 1.00
Notes: The table reports second moments in the model. Lprod is labor productivity per worker. urate
is the unemployment rate. All data are quarterly aggregates, in logs and multiplied by 100 in order to
express them in percent deviation from the steady state. We report unconditional standard deviations
from the model. The first row reports the standard deviation. The next row reports the autocorrelation.
The following rows report the contemporaneous correlation matrix. Table 1 reports the corresponding
business cycle statistics in the data.
than productivity and so are the job-finding and separation rates. Vacancies and unemployment
are negatively correlated, thus preserving the Beveridge-curve relationship. The job-finding rate
is procyclical, the separation rate countercyclical.
5 The optimal labor-market policy mix
We now proceed to a quantitative exploration of the optimal labor-market policy mix over the
business cycle. We first ask what the optimal mix of labor-market policies looks like in response
to a recessionary shock and how closely the resulting allocations resemble the (unattainable)
first-best in which search effort would be observable.14 Thereafter, we link our results to the
literature by restricting the planner to have access only to unemployment benefits financed by
taxes on production. We demonstrate that the resulting allocations would differ starkly from
those under the optimal policy mix. Then we show that, in constrast, the optimal use of vacancy
subsidies and layoff taxes alone (that is, leaving the replacement rate constant) would bring the
economy’s responses very close to the constrained-efficient allocation.
5.1 Optimal policy over the business cycle
Figure 1 shows the economy’s response to a 1 percent shock to productivity. Red dots mark
14 The steady state of this exercise is shown in Appendix D.
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Figure 1: Impulse response to a technology shock - baseline, planner, and first-best
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Notes: The figure shows responses of the monthly variables to a -1 percent shock to labor productivity (top
left corner). The solid black line marks responses in the planner economy (constrained-efficient equilibrium).
The blue dashed line marks responses in the calibrated baseline, the red dots the response in the first-best. All
variables are expressed in percentage deviation from the steady state. The x-axes cover a time period of 72
months (6 years).
the responses in the (unattainable) first-best. A black solid line marks the responses under the
constrained-efficient policy. The blue dashed line marks the responses in the calibrated baseline.
With its suboptimal policies, in the baseline the drop in productivity induces a strong and per-
sistent increase in the separation rate and a pronounced fall in the job-finding rate. Employment
falls considerably. The weakened prospects in the labor market along with the constant replace-
ment rate reduce the search incentives for unemployed workers. This adds to the unfolding of
the recession, since firms do not create jobs that would be desirable from the society’s point
of view. Output drops by considerably more than the movement in productivity alone would
suggest (see the blue dashed line).
The second set of responses that we show in Figure 1 concerns the first-best response of the
economy; see the red dots. The negative shock to aggregate productivity implies that jobs
with low idiosyncratic productivity become socially undesirable (recall that workers do generate
utility from leisure). As a result, the separation rate rises and with it unemployment. Moreover,
the first-best allocation induces an increase in search effort. Aggregate resources are scarce; so
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absent incentive constraints, the planner wishes to increase the search effort of the unemployed.
The first-best does not display the amplification of the aggregate productivity shock that we
witnessed in the baseline economy. In particular, job offers would be plentiful. As a result, the
rate ft at which searching workers find a job barely falls.
The last set of results that we show in Figure 1 concerns the constrained-efficient allocation; see
the solid black line. The constrained-efficient allocation stabilizes the separation margin relative
to the suboptimal baseline, if somewhat less so than in the first-best. The hiring margin is
stabilized in a way comparable to the first-best. Indeed, while the constrained-efficient allocation
features less search intensity than in the first-best, in percentage terms output and employment
both fall by less than would be dictated in the first-best (compare the solid black line and the
red dots). Intuitively, the constrained-efficient planner provides “over-employment” so as to be
able to provide consumption insurance in the recession.
Figure 2: Policy responses to a technology shock
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Notes: The figure shows the responses of the tax and benefit instruments that de-
centralize the constrained-efficient allocation (solid black line) and compares these
to the responses in the baseline (dashed blue). Shown is the response to a -1 per-
cent labor productivity shock as in Figure 1. The replacement rate and the vacancy
subsidy are expressed in percentage point deviation from the steady state. The lay-
off tax and production taxes are in deviation from the steady state (multiplied by
100). The x-axes cover a time period of 72 months (6 years).
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Figure 2 reports the corresponding tax and benefit system that implements the constrained-
efficient allocation in the decentralized economy. If the government cannot control the search
effort, it will not provide full insurance. The government will, however, optimally use all of the
tax instruments to influence economic activity. In the optimum, the replacement rate increases
by about 0.2 percentage point relative to the steady-state value of 45 percent. That increase
lasts for about a year. While the increase in unemployment benefits is reminiscent of the findings
in Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010), the reason why the government can and should provide
more insurance in a recession differs. In our framework, an increase in unemployment benefits
alone leads to higher wages, less hiring activity, and more separations. It is the availability
of the other two labor-market instruments that mitigates the adverse effects of higher benefits
and allows for providing better insurance in a recession. The planner uses vacancy subsidies
to stimulate the hiring margin in line with our Proposition 2. The government subsidizes an
additional 8.7 percent of the cost of posting a vacancy in the recession. Similarly, layoff taxes
ensure a more favorable outcome than in the decentralized economy, counteracting the exter-
nalities that come with increased unemployment duration. At its peak, the increase in layoff
taxes amounts to almost 20 percent of a monthly unemployment benefit payment. The increase
in both the vacancy subsidy and the layoff tax is persistent, mirroring the distortions induced
in the economy as the shock unfolds.
Table 4: Business cycle properties – baseline, constrained-efficient, first-best
y Lprod urate v f ξ w θ
Baseline
Standard deviation 3.37 1.85 18.71 23.07 12.29 7.70 1.74 40.96
Autocorrelation 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.96
Constrained-efficient
Standard deviation 2.06 1.85 6.61 4.60 0.59 6.12 1.55 1.96
Autocorrelation 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
First-best
Standard deviation 2.21 1.85 5.10 3.28 0.54 4.80 – 1.81
Autocorrelation 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.97 – 0.96
Notes: The table compares the model’s second moments for three alternative assumptions: the
baseline calibration, the constrained-efficient equilibrium and the first-best. Lprod is labor pro-
ductivity. urate is the unemployment rate. All entries are quarterly aggregates, in logs and
multiplied by 100 in order to express them in percent deviation from the steady state. The table
reports unconditional standard deviations. For each block, the first row reports the standard
deviation. The next row reports the autocorrelation.
The above responses under the different scenarios are also reflected in the properties of the
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business cycle in each of these; compare Table 4. Relative to the baseline, using the optimal
policy mix over the business cycle considerably reduces business cycle fluctuations, particularly
in regard to the unemployment rate and the job-finding rate. Under the first-best, the planner
would cushion labor-market fluctuations still more.
5.2 Restricted set of instruments
So far, we have worked under the assumption that the government makes use of all the labor-
market policy instruments. In this section, instead, we restrict the available set of instruments
to illustrate the mechanisms that are at work.
For comparison with the literature, for example, Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010) and Mit-
man and Rabinovich (2011), we first show the economy’s response when the planner optimizes
only the use of unemployment benefits (Figure 3). In order to highlight the effect of the ad-
ditional two labor-market instruments that we allow for, in a second step we then report the
responses if the government does optimally choose layoff taxes and hiring subsidies, but not
unemployment benefits (Figure 4 and Figure 5).
Figure 3 reports as magenta-colored diamonds the economy’s reaction to a recessionary shock
if the government chooses the response of unemployment benefits optimally, leaving layoff taxes
and vacancy subsidies at the steady-state values that decentralized the constrained-efficient
allocation.15
As before, the figure compares this to the responses in the first-best (red dots) and the constrained-
efficient equilibrium (solid black line). If variations in unemployment benefits are the only means
of inducing search effort in a recession (magenta-colored diamonds), the results are reminiscent
of Mitman and Rabinovich (2011). The government needs to trade off insurance through the
job and insurance through unemployment benefits, and opts for reducing the replacement rate
considerably. The replacement rate falls by almost 1 percentage point if labor productivity falls
by 1 percent. The reduction in the replacement rate follows the persistence of the underlying
shock. The lower replacement rate reduces the outside option of the worker, with the effect
that a) unemployed workers provide considerably more search effort, indeed much more so than
15 In the figures shown, we restrict the values of the instruments that are not optimized to the constant values
that would support the constrained-efficient equilibrium in the steady state. For example, when allowing the
planner to optimize only benefits, we set τv,t = 0.588 and τξ,t = 1.499. As a result, all of the scenarios with
restrictions on the instruments that we discuss in this section have the same steady state as the constrained-
efficient equilibrium. In any case, the responses would have been quite similar if we had instead restricted the
instruments that are not being optimized to the values that we calibrated in Section 4.
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Figure 3: Impulse response to a technology shock - only unemployment benefits react
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Notes: The figure shows responses of the monthly variables to a -1 percent shock to labor productivity. The
solid black line marks responses in the planner economy (constrained-efficient equilibrium). The red dots mark
responses in the first-best. The magenta diamonds mark the responses when, over the business cycle, the
government optimizes only unemployment benefits. The x-axes cover a time period of 72 months (6 years).
in the first-best, b) firms have more of an incentive to hire, but still much less so than in the
first-best, and c) separations of existing matches fall, in contrast to the increase in separations
witnessed in both the constrained-efficient and first-best equilibria. Indeed, the result of all this
– in the simulations shown – is that there would be too much output and employment relative
to both the first-best and the constrained-efficient allocation.
Conversely, the responses can be seen as showing that any increase in the replacement rate that
would not be accompanied by an increase in vacancy subsidies and layoff taxes would be bound to
deepen the recession. This highlights the importance of the additional labor-market instruments
for the optimal response. Figure 4 explores this further. Next to the response in the constrained-
efficient equilibrium (as before, the solid black line), the figure shows a scenario in which, starting
from the same steady-state value as before, the replacement rate rises exogenously in a recession.
The precise scenario features an increase in the replacement rate by 1 percentage point for any
1 percent fall in productivity. Benefits, therefore, rise about five times as much as in the
constrained-efficient equilibrium and more persistently (second line, left panel of Figure 4). For
this scenario for unemployment benefits, the figure shows two alternative responses of the layoff
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Figure 4: Impulse response to a technology shock - UI benefits rise exogenously
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Notes: The figure shows responses of the monthly variables to a -1 percent shock to labor productivity. The
solid black line marks responses in the planner economy (constrained-efficient equilibrium). The scenarios of
the other two lines have the same steady state as the constrained-efficient equilibrium. Blue crosses mark the
responses when the replacement rate rises in lockstep with a fall in productivity while vacancy subsidies and
the layoff tax are kept at their steady-state level. The green squares mark the responses when the replacement
rate rises with a fall in productivity but the government optimizes the vacancy subsidy and the layoff tax.
taxes and vacancy subsidies. Blue crosses mark the case when vacancy subsidies and layoff
taxes remain constant over the business cycle despite the increase in benefits. The result is
a deep recession with more layoffs and considerably less employment than in the constrained-
efficient equilibrium. The green squares, instead, show the case when this increase in benefits
is accompanied by a response of vacancy subsidies and layoff taxes that is chosen optimally.
Both of these non-standard instruments rise more strongly still than in the constrained-efficient
equilibrium. Vacancy subsidies and layoff taxes have a strong bearing on labor-market activity.
As a result, layoffs are contained. For the same increase in the replacement rate, output and
employment fall much less steeply than would be suggested by the increase in the benefits alone.
We conclude that it is the presence of vacancy subsidies and layoff taxes, and their optimal use,
that allows unemployment benefits to rise in the optimal policy mix of Figures 1 and 2 without
adversely affecting economic outcomes.
Last, we analyze the role of the vacancy subsidy and the layoff tax alone. Toward that end, Figure
5 shows as green squares the evolution of the economy if the government optimizes the response
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Figure 5: Impulse response to a technology shock - vacancy subsidy and layoff tax only
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Notes: The figure shows responses of the monthly variables to a -1 percent shock to labor productivity. The
solid black line marks responses in the planner economy (constrained-efficient equilibrium). The red dots
mark responses in the first-best. The green squares mark the responses when, over the business cycle, the
government optimizes only the vacancy subsidy and the layoff tax, but not benefits.
of vacancy subsidies and layoff taxes, but not of unemployment benefits. The latter remain
at their level in the constrained-efficient steady state. When only vacancy subsidies and layoff
taxes are optimized, the government steers the economy in a way that quite closely resembles
the constrained-efficient allocation, that is, an allocation that could have been implemented by
using all three labor-market instruments at the same time. This contrasts sharply with the case
when only unemployment benefits are optimized in response to the recession (see Figure 3).
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have assessed the optimal cyclical mix of labor-market instruments in a real
business cycle model with Mortensen and Pissarides (2003)-type matching frictions in the labor
market. The model features endogenous hiring and separations and endogenous search effort.
Search effort by unemployed workers is private information. The government therefore can-
not completely insure workers, who are risk-averse, against consumption fluctuations due to
unemployment.
We have shown analytically that the constrained-efficient allocation can be decentralized using,
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next to a production tax, three labor-market instruments: a layoff tax, a vacancy subsidy and
unemployment benefits. Analytical expressions for the optimal evolution of these instruments,
which we present, illustrate how the government optimally resolves the insurance-moral-hazard
tradeoff both in the steady state and over the business cycle. These expressions suggest that
not only are all three instruments positive in the steady state but also that these instruments
should increase further in response to a recessionary shock. Unemployment benefits rise to
provide enhanced insurance at a time when search is not particularly elastic. Hiring subsidies
rise because hiring can be induced at a lower cost in a recession: not only does the cost per hire
fall in a recession but also the opportunity cost of not having an unemployed worker hired rises
because the duration of unemployment rises in a recession. The resulting costs of unemployment
insurance can be reduced if unemployed workers transit back into employment more rapidly.
Last, layoff taxes rise so as to make workers and firms internalize the costs of separations
regarding unemployment benefits and hiring subsidies to the fiscal authority.
We have illustrated that vacancy subsidies and layoff taxes are essential for bringing the econ-
omy’s response to a recessionary impulse close to first-best. In the absence of these instruments,
the government would need to cut unemployment benefits quite dramatically – in the middle
of a recession – so as to induce search effort. Such a response runs counter to the optimal
behavior of benefits that we find in the optimal policy mix. It is precisely the availability of the
other two labor-market instruments that allows the government to maintain the generosity of
the unemployment insurance system in a recession.
Our work provides analytical and quantitative results. We have derived our results in a search
and matching model that does speak to some, but not all, of the current policy debate. For
example, the model does not capture the notion that there may be something inherently valuable
in keeping one’s job in a recession over and above the short-run consumption insurance that the
job provides. It has by now been rather well documented that there are scarring effects of
unemployment, for example, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), and that these tend to
be more pronounced in recessions; see Davis and von Wachter (2011). It would seem important
to analyze the resulting tradeoffs and optimal government policies in a richer environment that
allows for such effects, for example, one with loss of human capital during unemployment along
the lines of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008).
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A Planner’s Problem
We state the social planner’s problem in recursive form. The planner enters the period fac-
ing the following state variables: aggregate productivity state a, ep employed workers and a
promised utility difference ∆p. Here as in the following, a superscript p marks the alloca-
tion in the planner problem. The planner maximizes a utilitarian welfare function, choosing
state-contingent promised utility ∆p′a′ levels,
16 consumption choices cpe and c
p
u, separation deci-
sions ξp and market tightness θp. Let Ψx(x) denote the option value of having a choice with
Ψx(x) := −ψx[(1− x) log(1− x) + x log(x)], and with µǫ the average cost.
17
The planner’s problem can be written as
W(a, ep,∆p) = max
ξp,θp,c
p
e,c
p
u,{∆p′a′}
epu(cpe)+(1−e
p)u(cpu)+[ξ
pep+(1−ep)](Ψs(s
p)+h)+βEaW(a
′, ep′,∆p′)
subject to the budget constraint
ep(1− ξp) exp{a} = cpee
p + (1− ep)cpu + µǫ(1− ξ
p)ep − epΨξ(ξ
p) + κv[ξ
pep + (1− ep)]spθp, (35)
the participation constraint
sp =
1
1 + e
−fpβEa∆
p′
ψs
(36)
the promise-keeping constraint
∆p = u(cpe)− h(1− ξ
p)− u(cpu) + βEa∆
p′(1− ξp) + (1− ξp)ψs log(1− s
p), (37)
and the constraint on the law of motion for employment
ep′ = ep(1− ξp) + [ξpep + (1− ep)]spχ (θp)γ . (38)
In the last expression, the job-finding rate is defined as f ≡ χ (θp)γ . Denoting by λp∆ the
Lagrange multiplier on the promise-keeping constraint and by λpc the Lagrange multiplier on the
budget constraint, the first-order conditions with respect to the two consumption levels ce and
cu deliver:
λp∆ =
[u′(cpe)− u′(c
p
u)]ep(1− ep)
u′(cpe)(1− ep) + epu′(c
p
u)
, (39)
λpc =
u
′(cpe)u′(c
p
u)
u′(cpe)(1− ep) + epu′(c
p
u)
=
[
ep
u′(ce)
+
1− ep
u′(cu)
]−1
. (40)
16 In terms of notation, subindex a′ here indicates that the level of future promised utility is chosen in a state-
contingent way.
17 In the following, we sketch the derivations skipping over a number of intermediate steps. A technical appendix
that goes through all the derivations in much more detail is available from the authors upon request.
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The first-order condition regarding separations, ξp, is given by
0 = [Ψs(s) + h] + λ
p
c [− exp{a} + µǫ +Ψ
′
ξ(ξ
p)− κvs
pθp]
+
λ
p
∆
ep
[Eaβ∆
p′ − h] +
λ
p
∆
ep
ψs log(1− s) + βEa
∂W
∂e′
[−1 + sfp].
(41)
The first-order condition for market tightness θ delivers:
0 = −
[
κv + κv
∂sp
∂θp
θp
sp
]
− Eaβ
∆p′
λpc
∂sp
∂θp
fp
sp
+ Eaβ
λp′c
λpc
∂W
∂ep′
λp′c
[
γ
fp
θp
+
∂sp
∂θp
fp
sp
]
+
λp∆
λpc
ψs
1
1− sp
∂sp
∂θp
1
sp
(1− ξp)
[ξpep + (1− ep)]
. (42)
The first-order conditions for state-contingent promised utility ∆p
′
are:
β
λp∆
λpc
(1− ξp) = β
λp′c
λpc
∂W
∂∆p′
λp′c
+
λp∆
λpc
ψs
1− sp
(1− ξp)
∂sp
∂∆p′
+[1− (1− ξp)ep]ψs log
(
1− sp
sp
)
∂sp
∂∆p′
+Eaβ
λp′c
λpc
∂W
∂ep′
λp′c
fp
∂sp
∂∆p′
[1− (1− ξp)ep]− κv
∂sp
∂∆p′
θp[1− (1− ξp)ep]. (43)
The envelope conditions are:
∂W
∂∆p
λpc
=
λp∆
λpc
. (44)
∂W
∂ep
λpc
=
[u(cpe)− u(c
p
u)]
λpc
−
(1− ξp)
[
Ψ(sp) + h
]
λpc
+ Eaβ
λp′c
λpc
∂W
∂ep′
λp′c
(1− spfp)(1− ξp)
+(1− ξp) [exp{a} − µǫ]− c
p
e + c
p
u +Ψξ(ξ
p)
+κvs
pθp(1− ξp). (45)
After a sequence of manipulations one can derive a “bargaining equation of the planner”:
κv
θp
γfp
= Eaβ
λp′c
λpc
Jp′ + (1 + ςp)Eaβ
λp′c
λpc
∆p′
u′(cp′e )
, (46)
where we have defined Jp :=
∂W
∂ep
λ
p
c
− ∆
p
λ
p
c
, and the wedge ςp as
ςp =
ep(1− ξp)
[ξpep + (1− ep)]fpsp

1−
u
′(cp′e )
λ
p′
c
u′(cpe)
λ
p
c

 . (47)
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Similarly, one can derive the “planner’s free-entry condition”:
κv
θp
fp
= Eaβ
λp′c
λpc
Jp′ − ζp, (48)
where we have defined the wedge ζp as
ζp =
ψs
fp(1− sp)
1
[ξpep + (1− ep)]
1
λpc
[
λpc
u′(cpe)
− 1
]
+
ψs
fp(1− sp)
1
spfp[ξpep + (1− ep)]
1
λpc
ep′
[
λp′c
u′(cp′e )
−
λpc
u′(cpe)
]
. (49)
An extensive derivation is available upon request.
A.1 The ratio of marginal utilities next period is measurable this period
This section shows that the planner promises marginal utilities of consumption in the next period
such that the ratio of these, u′(c′u)/(u
′(c′e)), is measurable in this period. That is, next period’s
ratio of marginal utilities is known already today. As a special case, for CRRA utility, under
the planner’s allocations, the “replacement rate” next period, bp′ := cp′u /c
p′
e therefore is known
already this period.
The promise-keeping constraint, equation (43), can be rewritten as
β
λp∆
λpc
(1− ξp) = β
λp′c
λpc
∂W
∂∆p′
λp′c
+
λp∆
λpc
ψs
1− sp
(1− ξp)
∂sp
∂∆p′
−[1− (1− ξp)ep]fpβEa
{
∆p′
λpc
}
∂sp
∂∆p′
+Eaβ
λp′c
λpc
∂W
∂ep′
λp′c
fp
∂sp
∂∆p′
[1− (1− ξp)ep]− κv
∂sp
∂∆p′
θp[1− (1− ξp)ep].
Observe that, by envelope condition (44),
λp′c
λpc
∂W
∂∆p′
λp′c
=
λp′c
λpc
λ′∆
λp′c
=
λ′∆
λpc .
Then observe that ∂sp/(∂∆p′) is measurable this period. As a result, all terms in the promise-
keeping constraint apart from λ′∆ are measurable this period. Therefore, λ
′
∆ also needs to be
measurable this period. λ′∆ therefore is independent of the realization of the future shock.
Now, use the first-order conditions for consumption, which imply equation (39). Rearranging
this, and moving it one period forward,
λp′∆ =
[
1− u
′(cp′u )
u′(cp′e )
]
ep′(1− ep′)
(1− ep′) + ep′ u
′(cp′u )
u′(cp′e )
.
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Employment at the beginning of the next period is known as of this period; compare employment-
flow equation (38). Therefore, if λp′∆ is measurable this period, so must the ratio of next period’s
marginal utilities u
′(cp′u )
u′(cp′e )
. The claim regarding the replacement rate follows from the fact that for
CRRA utility
u
′(cp′u )
u′(cp′e )
=
(
cp′u
cp′e
)−σ
,
where σ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
B Decentralization
This section decentralizes the equilibrium allocation in the planner’s problem by means of a set
of benefit and tax rules. First, we define a decentralized equilibrium. This definition collects
all equilibrium conditions in the decentralized economy. Then, we state Proposition 3, which is
a slightly more general version of Proposition 2 in the main text. The proposition states that
certain tax rules decentralize the planner’s allocation. We sketch the proof of the proposition.18
In order to show the equivalence and save on notation, this section uses t-notation throughout.
B.1 Definition: decentralized equilibrium
A decentralized equilibrium is a sequence of job-finding rates ft, vacancy-filling rates qt, separa-
tion rates and separation cutoff levels ξt and ǫ
ξ
t , search intensities st, labor market tightness θt,
matches mt, vacancies vt, consumption levels ce,t, c0,t, and cu,t, aggregate levels of output yt, and
dividends Πt, a discount factor Qt,t+1, wage rates wt, severance payments weu,t, employment
rates et, firm values Jt, and surpluses of the worker ∆t, and a sequence of government policies
(a profit tax rate, τJ,t, a vacancy subsidy, τv,t, a layoff tax τξ,t and unemployment benefits Bt)
such that the following are true:
1. The value of the firm is given by (10) and can be rearranged to:
Jt = [exp{at} − µǫ − wt − τJ,t + EtQt,t+1Jt+1]
−ψǫ log(1− ξt) + ξt
[
βEt∆
e
u,t+1 + ψs log(1− st)− h
u′(ce,t)
]
. (50)
2. The surplus of the worker is given by (2) and (5) and can be rearranged to:
∆eu,t = u(ce,t)− h(1− ξ,t)− u(cu,t) + βEa∆
e
u,t+1(1− ξt) + (1− ξt)ψs log(1− st). (51)
18 A detailed derivation is available from the authors upon request.
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3. The search intensity is chosen optimally and is given by:
st =
1
1 + e
−ftβEt∆
e
u,t+1
ψs
. (52)
4. Firms choose the number of vacancies optimally, the free-entry condition equation (11) is
repeated below:
κv
θt
ft
(1− τv,t) = EtQt,t+1Jt+1. (53)
5. Wages wt, severance payments, weu,t, and separation cutoffs, ǫ
ξ
t , are bargained according
to Nash-bargaining protocol (12). The resulting first-order conditions are:
(a) For the wage, equation (13) is repeated here:
(1− ηt)Jt = ηt
∆eu,t
u′(ce,t)
. (54)
(b) For the severance payments
weu,t = we,t. (55)
(c) For the separation cutoff, equation (14) is repeated here:
ǫξt = [exp{at} − τJ,t + τξ,t + EtQt,t+1Jt+1
+
βEt∆eu,t+1+ψs log(1−st)−h
u′(ce,t)
.
(56)
6. The separation cutoff implies a share of separations, ξt, that is in line with the logistic
distribution. The corresponding equation (15) is repeated here:
ξt = 1/(1 + exp{(ǫ
ξ
t − µǫ)/ψǫ}. (57)
7. Matches link vacancies and workers who search for a job according to matching function
(8), repeated here:
mt = stft[ξtet + ut]. (58)
8. The job-finding rate is defined as
ft = mt/(st[ξtet + ut]). (59)
9. The vacancy-filling rate is defined as
qt = mt/vt. (60)
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10. Labor-market tightness is defined as
θt = vt/ut. (61)
11. Employment evolves according to (7), or alternatively:
et+1 = (1− ξt)et + stft[ξtet + ut]. (62)
12. Firms price future cash flow using discount factor Qt,t+1 := β
λt+1
λt
, where λt is given by
equation (9):
λt =
u
′(ce,t)u
′(cu,t)
u′(ce,t)(1− et) + etu′(cu,t)
. (63)
13. Dividends are given by equation (16), which can be rewritten as
Πt = et(1− ξt)[exp{at} − µǫ − τJ,t]− etwt − etξtτξ,t + etΨ(ξt)− κv(1− τv,t)vt. (64)
14. Consumption is given by (1), namely
(a) Consumption when employed during the period:
ce,t = wt +Πt. (65)
(b) Consumption when laid off at the beginning of the period:
c0,t = wt +Πt. (66)
(c) Consumption when unemployed at the beginning of the period:
cu,t = Bt +Πt. (67)
15. Production equals demand (goods markets clear, Section 2.8 in the text)
yt = et(1− ξt) exp{at}. (68)
yt = etce,t + utcu,t + µǫ(1− ξt)et − etΨǫ(ξt) + κvvt (69)
16. The government budget constraint, equation (17), holds:
et(1− ξt)τJ,t + etξtτξ,t = utBt + κvτvvt. (70)
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B.2 Government policies that decentralize the planner’s allocation
First, let us rearrange and restate in t-notation the two wedges defined earlier in equations (47)
and (49):
ςt =
et(1− ξt)
[ξtet + (1− et)]ftst

1− u
′(ce,t+1)
u′(cu,t+1)
(1− et+1) + et+1
u′(ce,t)
u′(cu,t)
(1− et) + et

 , (71)
and
ζt =
ψs
ft(1− st)
1
λt
1− et
[ξtet + (1− et)]
1−
u
′(ce,t)
u′(cu,t)
u′(ce,t)
u′(cu,t)
(1− et) + et
(72)
+
ψs
ft(1− st)
1
stft[ξtet + (1− et)]
1
λt
et+1

 1
u′(ce,t+1)
u′(cu,t+1)
(1− et+1) + et+1
−
1
u′(ce,t)
u′(cu,t)
(1− et) + et

 .
The following proposition summarizes the tax and benefit rules that support the social’s planner
allocation.
Proposition 3. Consider the economy described in Section 2. Consider preferences for which
the ratio of marginal utilities in the two states of employment can be expressed as some function
g, the sole argument of which is the replacement rate bt := cu,t/ce,t. Namely,
u
′(ce,t)
u′(cu,t)
= g(bt).
Define Ωt :=
ηt
γ
1−γ
1−ηt
. In addition, assume that the bargaining power ηt is measurable t − 1.
Assume that the values of the tuple of initial states (b0, a0, e0) is the same in the decentralized
economy and in the planner’s problem described in Appendix A. Suppose, in addition, that the
government implements the following policies for all periods t ≥ 0:
τv,t =
[
1−
Ωt+1
1 + ςt
]
+
ηt+1
1− ηt+1
ζt
(1 + ςt)κv
θt
ft
, (73)
τξ,t = τJ,t + τv,tκv
θt
ft
+ ζt(1− stft), (74)
bt+1Et
[
β
λt+1
λt
ce,t+1
et+1
]
= τv,tκv
θt
ft
+ ζt − Et
[
β
λt+1
λt
ζt+1(1− st+1ft+1)(1 − ξt+1)
]
−Et
[
β
λt+1
λt
τv,t+1κv
θt+1
ft+1
et+2
et+1
]
+ Et
[
β
λt+1
λt
Πt+1
et+1
]
, (75)
τJ,t =
1− et
et
[btce,t −Πt] + κvτv,tθt
[
1− et
et
st − ξt
1− stft
ft
]
−ζtξt(1− stft), (76)
where the two wedges, ςt and ζt, are given by equations (71) and (72).
Then these tax rules are consistent with the government’s budget constraint in the decentralized
economy. In addition, the equilibrium allocations in the decentralized equilibrium satisfy the
first-order conditions in the planner’s problem and vice versa.
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
A detailed proof is available from the authors as part of the longer technical appendix. In the
interest of space, here we limit ourselves to sketching the steps. The planner’s allocation is
characterized by five first-order conditions:
1. With respect to separations: equation (41),
2. With respect to market tightness (hiring): equation (48),
3. With respect to future promised utility: equation (46),
4. With respect to consumption when employed: equation (40),
5. With respect to consumption when unemployed: equation (39),
and four constraints
1. The budget constraint: equation (35),
2. The participation constraint: equation (36),
3. The promise-keeping constraint: equation (37),
4. The law of motion for employment: equation (38).
The proof proceeds by guessing that the allocations in the planner’s problem satisfy the equilib-
rium conditions of the decentralized economy if the tax and benefit rules stated in Proposition
3 are used. This guess is then verified. Next, the proof shows that with these allocations and
the resulting values for taxes and benefits the government’s budget is balanced. Then, the proof
argues that doing the steps sketched above in reverse order, the opposite would be true as well:
the equilibrium allocations that result when the tax rules described in Proposition 3 are used in
the decentralized economy satisfy the equilibrium conditions of the planner’s problem.
C Relation to the Baily-Chetty formula
In this Appendix, we show how our formula for optimal UI benefits relates to the Baily-Chetty
formula, compare Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006). We do so in the steady state and for the
limiting case of β → 1.
The average duration of unemployment is given by D := 1/(sf). The average duration over
which the government pays unemployment benefits is given by D2 := D − 1. Note that D2 is
one period shorter than D. The reason is that in the first period of an unemployment spell the
worker still consumes ce (financed by a severance payment by the firm), not a state-financed cu.
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Define the elasticity of the duration of unemployment with respect to an increase in next period’s
consumption of an unemployed worker as
ǫD :=
∂ logD
∂ log c′u
∣∣∣∣
f,∆′′
.
This elasticity treats the continuation value next period, ∆′′, and aggregate variables (such as
the aggregate job-finding rate) now and in the future as constant. Evaluating for β → 1, we
have that
ǫD =
f
ψs
(1− s)u′(c′u)c
′
u. (77)
Evaluating this at steady-state values gives
ǫD =
f
ψs
(1− s)u′(cu)cu.
Also define the elasticity of the duration of unemployment benefit payments with respect to an
increase in next period’s consumption of an unemployed worker as
ǫD2 :=
∂ logD2
∂ log c′u
∣∣∣∣
f,∆′′
=
D
D2
ǫD.
Next, from equations (40) and (72), observe that
ζ =
ψs
f(1− s)
1− e
ξe+ (1− e)
u
′(cu)− u
′(ce)
u′(ce)u′(cu)
=
1− e
ξe+ (1− e)
cu
u
′(cu)−u′(ce)
u′(ce)
ǫD
.
From equation (21), we have that as β → 1:
cu = ζsf.
Substitute for ζ from above to obtain
cu = sf
1− e
ξe+ (1− e)
cu
u
′(cu)−u′(ce)
u′(ce)
ǫD
,
or
u
′(cu) = u
′(ce)
[
1 + ǫDD
ξe+ (1− e)
1− e
]
. (78)
Express this in terms of ǫD2 :
u
′(cu) = u
′(ce)
[
1 + ǫD2D2
ξe+ (1− e)
1− e
]
.
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To simplify this further, note that from the employment-flow equation we have that
sf =
ξe
ξe+ 1− e
,
and that
1− sf =
1− e
ξe+ 1− e
.
Also, D2 = (1− sf)/sf = D(1− sf). So
D2
ξe+ (1− e)
1− e
= D(1− sf)
ξe+ (1− e)
1− e
= D.
We can therefore rewrite the optimal UI benefit formula (78) as
u
′(cu) = u
′(ce) [1 +D ǫD2 ] . (79)
An increase in UI payments for an unemployed worker reduces consumption of an employed
worker one by one. It also changes the duration of unemployment by ǫD2 . Since unemployment
spells last on average paid for D periods, we have that the total indirect effect on consumption
of an employed worker is D ǫD2 .
D Steady-state properties under the optimal policy mix
This Appendix presents the steady states in the calibrated baseline, the constrained-efficient
economy and the first-best; see Table 5. This complements the analysis in Sections 4 and 5.1.
Table 5: Steady state – baseline, constrained-efficient planner, first-best
planner baseline first-best planner baseline first-best
B 0.427 [0.424] – u 0.021 [0.057] (0.046)
b 0.453 [0.451] – urate 0.026 [0.064] (0.064)
ce 0.945 [0.945] (0.924) e 0.978 [0.943] (0.953)
c0 0.945 [0.945] (0.924) s 0.845 [0.843] (0.947)
cu 0.428 [0.426] (0.924) f 0.369 [0.282] (0.329)
∆eu 0.996 [1.291] – ξ 0.010 [0.018] (0.022)
w 0.943 [0.943] – q 0.180 [0.338] (0.235)
weu 0.943 [0.943] – θ 2.049 [0.834] (1.405)
J 0.403 [0.523] – v 0.053 [0.052] (0.089)
Π .0015 [0.002] – y 0.968 [0.925] (0.932)
τξ 1.499 [0.680] – τJ 0.000 [0.013] –
τv 0.588 [0.000] – ζ 1.343 [1.929] (0.000)
Notes: The table compares the steady-state values of the planner’s problem (constrained-efficient) with those
of the baseline calibration of Section 4 (in square brackets), and the first-best allocation (in round brackets).
We discuss these briefly. If the planner could directly control the search effort (and thus attain
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the first-best), the planner would perfectly insure the consumption of all workers regardless of
their labor-market state. At the same time, the vast majority of unemployed workers would
have to search for a job. More vacancies would be posted so that the steady-state job-finding
rate would be higher than in the baseline economy. Out of efficiency considerations, the rate
of separation would be higher as well, so that only the lowest-cost matches produce. Output
would rise 0.7 percent above the steady-state level of output in the baseline economy. Note that
due to perfect consumption insurance in the first-best the tensions summarized by ζt are zero.
This is a major difference to the constrained-efficient allocation. If search effort cannot be
commanded or observed, the planner has to trade off the utility benefits from insurance and
the distortions in behavior that insurance generates. The planner does this by providing some –
but at a 45 percent replacement rate less than perfect – unemployment insurance. In addition,
the planner makes sure that those workers who do search have a reasonably high chance of first
finding a job and then a much lower probability of losing the job than in the baseline calibration.
As a result of this – and with the search intensity affected little – the unemployment rate falls
from 6.4 percent in the baseline to 2.6 percent, and steady-state employment rises. Note that the
increase in output and employment is stronger than in the first-best. This is due to the fact that,
for reasons of incentive-compatibility, the planner seeks to provide insurance primarily through
opportunities to work and job security rather than by means of unemployment benefits.19
As suggested by Proposition 1, the tax, subsidy and benefit system that supports the constrained-
efficient allocation features positive unemployment benefits. The government would use positive
vacancy subsidies and positive layoff taxes to ameliorate the resulting distortions. The size of
both of these instruments is quantitatively significant. The vacancy subsidy is worth about 59
percent of the cost of posting a vacancy. Layoff taxes amount to about 1.6 monthly wages. The
production tax is close to zero in the steady state.
19 Our paper restricts the set of contracts that firms and workers can write to one-period contracts. In some
sense, the result of “insurance through the job” on behalf of the government is related to the results that the
implicit-contract literature stresses for privately optimal contracts in the absence of social insurance; see, for
example, Azariadis (1975), and Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980).
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